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HERBERT BERNSTEIN

Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under
American Tort Law
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the American federal system, liability for a tort (delictual
liability) is governed mainly by state law, not federal law. As an exception to this rule, maritime torts are governed by federal law. Consequently, and since each of the 50 states has its own law of torts, all
of the statements made in this paper with respect to liability for pure
economic loss under American law must be understood as generalizations (abstractions) which may not fully reflect the statutory and/or
case law in any individual state of the United States.
In the most general of terms, it can be said that purely economic
loss is not recoverable under American tort law rules of negligence.
That, however, does not mean that economic losses can never be recovered in a negligence case, e.g., in a case where the plaintiff suffers
both physical injury and economic loss. For example, a loss of wages
resulting from personal injury to the plaintiff may well be recoverable. Similarly, the loss of rent resulting from physical damage to the
plaintiffs tangible property may be recoverable. In these instances,
the plaintiff would be claiming "consequential damages"' attributable
to an event which constitutes a tort, provided certain requirements,
such as negligence, causation, absence of excuses, etc., are met. Thus
there would be a basis for liability; the only remaining question
would involve the extent of liability. And thus the main issue in this
type of case would be whether economic consequences of personal injury or damage to tangible property need to be foreseeable or meet
some other test, before such loss can be recovered.
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1. As to this concept and its application in various legal systems, see Joseph
Lookofsky, ConsequentialDamages in Comparative Context (1989). For some strange
reason, consequential damages are also called "parasitic;" see Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 43, at 291 (W. Keeton, 5' ed. 1984).
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When, however, we speak of pure economic loss, we generally refer to situations in which the plaintiff has neither suffered personal
injury nor damage to tangible property. In these instances American
law is generally opposed to recovery on a negligence theory. But this
no-liability rule has not gone uncriticized and is not without important exceptions. Various theoretical approaches have been suggested
to rationalize the rule as well as the exceptions. Courts have also
been criticized for occasionally allowing an exception that appears
unjustified or, on the other hand, for applying the rule where an exception should have been made. The rule as such, however, and the
need for certain exceptions are generally accepted by most legal
commentators.
The first part of this paper will discuss the rule of no-liability and
the exceptions to this rule, as they emerge from the relevant case law.
In view of the limited space available, only the more important lines
of fairly recent cases will be analyzed. In its second part the paper
will outline some of the arguments American authors have developed
in their discourse (la doctrine) involving the legal treatment of pure
economic loss.
II.

CASE LAW

A leading 20th century case reaffirming the traditional rule
which bars recovery for pure economic loss in negligence, is Robins
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,2 a 1927 Supreme Court opinion by
Justice Holmes. In this maritime case the time charterers of a ship
claimed damages for the loss of use of the ship from the defendant, a
dry dock company. The. ship had been delivered to the defendant
under the terms of the charter party which provided for its docking
every six months. While so docked, the ship's spare propeller was
negligently damaged by the defendant during installation and had to
be replaced. As a consequence of the resulting delay in the return of
the ship, plaintiffs suffered a loss of use and income. Based on a finding that the ship had remained in the owners' possession while
chartered under a time charter, the court rejected an analogy with
cases involving bailees and held that the plaintiffs had no "property
right" in the ship. Since it was also found that the plaintiffs were not
third-party beneficiaries of the defendant's contract with the shipowners, the court concluded: "The injury to the propeller was no
wrong to the respondents [= plaintiffs], but only to those to whom it
belonged." The court noted that, arguably, the shipowners could have
recovered the plaintiffs' loss, acting as the plaintiffs' trustees in the
process of recovering for the full loss of use. But instead of claiming
damages for the entire loss including the plaintiffs loss of use (alleg2. See 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
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edly worth more than $33,000), the owners had reached a settlement
with the defendant in the amount of little more than $3,000 and had
given it a release from all claims. 3 In these circumstances, the plaintiffs, who themselves had no contract with the defendant, were denied direct recovery for their loss - a loss which the court saw as
"pure economic loss." 4
As the just-qoted passage shows, the U.S. Supreme Court relied
heavily on the traditional Common Law view that a tortious wrong
presupposes the violation of a "duty" owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. According to the court, in cases involving damage to property such a duty is owed only to those who have a right in rem with
respect to the damaged piece of property. Consequently, someone entitled to its use merely by virtue of a contract right is not directly
protected by the tort law rules of negligence.
For essentially the same reasons, employers have been denied
recovery against negligent defendants for economic losses suffered as
a consequence of injury to the plaintiffs employee. 5 If, however, a
family member or spouse, as distinguished from an employer, is deprived of the services and/or the support of a person negligently injured or killed, he or she may have a cause of action. This would
result from some ancient form of action called per quod consortium
amisit or, in case of death, from a more modern statutory cause of
action under a Wrongful Death Act. Actually, the harm suffered by
the plaintiff in these cases can be viewed as "pure economic loss." And
yet this loss becomes recoverable, once a statute says so or when
some corresponding judge-made concept comes into play, like that of
consortium, which helps the plaintiff to rely on the violation of a
quasi-proprietary right or "status" whose violation can be conceptualized as having occurred simultaneously with the injury to the principal victim. In fact, in the past even an employer (then called a
"master") could use a related form of action, per quod servitium
amisit, to claim damages for injuries negligently inflicted on his "servant" - an employee, in contemporary terminology.6 Most American
3. See Flint v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 13 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1926). It appears
from the Court of Appeals opinion that, at the time of the settlement, the defendant
had notice of the plaintiffs' charter and their claim; thus the settlement seems to have
been intended to cover only the owners' loss. The amount of the settlement probably
represented the rent the plaintiff-charterers did not have to pay to the owner, and the
owners thus did not receive, for the time of the delay.
4. For criticism of this characterization, see infra text at n. 96.
5. See, for example, The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927). This case
involved expenses for the care and cure of a seaman. In a related line of cases increased workers' compensation payments could not be recovered by the employer.
6. For a recent case summarizing the history of the cause of action since Roman
times, see Morton v. Merrillville Toyota, Inc. 562 N.E. 2d 781 (Ct. App. Ind. 1990). As
discussed in the opinion, some American courts extended the action beyond the realm
of household employees; id. at 784.
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states have abolished the action, 7 but it seems that in a few states it
is still available, or at least was still available fairly recently.8
Do the cases where an employer or a family member recovers for
the loss of services owed by the victim of a tortious injury on a theory
of per quod consortium amisit or per quod servitium amisit, stand for
an exception to the principle that negligently caused pure economic
loss is not recoverable? From a strictly doctrinal point of view the
principle could be said to remain intact, since the loss that would
otherwise be purely economic is said to be transformed into a consequential loss resulting from a tort committed against the plaintiffemployer (or family member). The construct of a quasi-proprietary
right or "status" attributed to the plaintiff is the mechanism which
performs this miracle. Given such a right or "status," the plaintiff is
no longer seen as claiming recovery for a pure economic loss resulting
from a tort committed against the property or the person of another.
Rather, the plaintiffs own legal position is viewed as the object of a
concomitant tort. Since, unlike any ordinary party to a contract, the
plaintiff enjoys an "in-rem" (property) right, he or she is protected
"against the whole world" by the rules of tort law.
So, at least on a doctrinal level, the results in the foregoing cases
can be rationalized consistently with the principle of non-liability for
pure economic loss. There are, however, numerous cases in which
genuine exceptions to the principle have been carved out, and there
are some in which even the principle itself has been questioned.
Most, if not all of these cases can be grouped by subject-matter in the
sense of typical fact patterns. From another perspective, a geographical grouping might appear to be meaningful, because there are a
number of states whose courts have gone further than the majority in
allowing recovery for pure economic loss. Since these two groupings
do overlap, they will have to be combined in the following analysis.
A.

Intellectual Services

Accountants, lawyers, architects and other professionals who
provide primarily intellectual services (information, advice, plans
etc.), do so ordinarily on the basis of a contract. If the client is disappointed with the quality of the service and a financial loss is arguably
attributable to the service as rendered, the client may have a cause of
action for breach of contract, and perhaps also for malpractice. Some7. See id. at 784 and Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356, 361-63
(Alas. 1987).
8. In Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co. 583 P. 2d 721 (Cal. 1978), as
recently as 20 years ago, the California court had to resolve a conflict-of-laws issue
resulting from the continued validity of the old rule in California and its non-existence in Louisiana. But see also Weinrot v. Jackson, 708 P.2d 682 (Cal. 1985), a case in
which the California Supreme Court limited application of the old cause of action to
domestic servants.
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times, however, a person other than the client claims to have suffered
a loss as a consequence of poorly/negligently rendered intellectual
services. Can such a third party recover in a negligence action?
Earlier in this century it appeared that at least some prominent
and influential American judges were inclined to allow recovery in
these cases in a variety of circumstances. In Glanzer v. Shepard9 a
seller of beans had contracted with a professional weigher for the
beans to be weighed and a weight certificate to be issued. The plaintiff-buyer had paid the price in accordance with the weight so certified and later discovered that the real weight was less. The New York
Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Cardozo, allowed the plaintiff-buyer to recover in a negligence action against the weigher on the
theory that the buyer's conduct (paying the price in reliance on the
certificate) was "the end and aim of the transaction."
Only nine years later the New York court, this time speaking
through Chief Judge Cardozo, made it clear that Glanzer was to be
read quite narrowly. In UltramaresCorp. v.Touche1 ° the defendantsaccountants had audited a business and supplied it with 32 certified
copies of the balance sheets based on the company's books. The problem was that the books (i.e., the basis on which the balance sheets
were prepared) had been falsified by those in charge of the business.
Thus, although the balance sheet showed a net worth of $1 million,
the company was actually insolvent. After the plaintiff had received
one of the certified copies of the balance sheet, the plaintiff extended
credit to the company and-as a consequence of its reliance on the
sheet-suffered an economic loss. The complaint alleged negligent
(and also fraudulent) misrepresentation by the defendant. While in
the court's view the jury might well find the defendants to have acted
negligently, the court distinguished Glanzer and held that the transmission of the balance sheet to the plaintiff in Ultramares was not
the "end and aim of the transaction." Even though the defendants
were found to have known that the certified balance sheet would be
exhibited to banks, creditors, stockholders, etc. as the basis of financial dealings, the Ultramares-defendantsdid not know the identity of
these persons and the extent or number of the transactions in which
the balance sheet would be used. In this situation the court was unwilling to impose liability for negligence, because doing so might "expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.""
More than fifty years later the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed its narrow interpretation of the exception to the principle of no
liability for pure economic loss in the case of accountants and similar
9. See 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
10. See 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
11. Id. at 444.
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service providers by restating the test of "quasi-privity" embraced by
the Glanzer-Ultramarespair of cases. 12 It may even have tightened
this test by emphasizing the "nexus" or "bond" between the plaintiff
and the defendant that, according to those precedents, are required
for the imposition of liability in a case of negligence. 13 The court now
requires "some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to
[the plaintiff!, which evinces the accountants' understanding of [the
plaintiffs] reliance."1 4 It appears as if nine states follow New York's
"quasi-privity" approach. 15
The Restatement Second of Torts, on the other hand, and a
number of American jurisdictions have taken a more liberal position.
Instead of insisting on "quasi-privity" between the parties, the crucial
test under this approach is satisfied if the defendant supplied information for the guidance of others in their business conduct and plaintiff belongs to a group of persons which the defendant knew would
receive the information generated by the defendant, provided the
loss-causing transaction based on the information is, at least, similar
to the one the defendant intended to influence. 16 It seems that at
least 17 state and federal decisions had adopted the Restatement's
"intended beneficiary model" by 1992.17 At that time the Supreme
Court of California joined this group in a carefully reasoned
opinion.18
The limited exceptions from the rule barring recovery for pure
economic loss have been criticized as providing "anachronistic protection" for accountants, and the application of a mere "foreseeability"
test has been suggested for these cases.19 Heeding this criticism, the
New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the foreseeability approach 15
years ago, subject to certain provisos applicable to institutional investors. 20 Apparently, only two other state supreme courts have endorsed a foreseeability analysis in cases of auditor-negligence, and
most commentators have criticized the alleged propensity of the ap12. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y.
1985). "Quasi-privity" refers to a requirement approaching that of a contractual
relationship.
13. See Ultramares, supra n.10, at 445, 446 distinguishing Glanzer, supra n. 9.
14. Credit Alliance case, supra n.12, at 118.
15. For details, see citations in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 755
(Cal. 1992).
16. See Restatement Second of Torts § 552.
17. See the Bily case, supra n.15, at 759.
18. See the Bily case, supra n.15.
19. See Wiener, "Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for
Negligent Misrepresentation," 20 San Diego L. Rev. 233 (1983). In the author's view,
foreseeablity in these cases is to be treated as a question of fact for the jury.
20. See Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983). Arguably, the plaintiff in
this case could have recovered even under the Restatement test. Note also that, on the
other hand, the foreseeability approach, as interpreted by the New Jersey court, protects only parties who received the audit from the company for the purpose of influencing their conduct; see id. at 153.
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proach to engender indeterminate liability and the problematic effect
of deterrence that proponents of the approach expect to follow from
it.21

While the liability of accountants has attracted more attention
than that of any other branch in the intellectual service industry,
there are also cases involving the liability of attorneys and other legal
professionals for pure economic loss of third parties. A leading case is
Biakanja v.Irving,22 in which a notary public had agreed to prepare
a will and negligently failed to have it properly attested by two witnesses. As a consequence, the plaintiff, the testator's sister, who
would have been the sole heir under the will received only one-eighth
of the estate. The court held the defendant-notary liable in a negligence action stating that the question of liability was a matter of policy to be determined by balancing various factors. Among them the
court mentioned the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff, the foreseeablity of harm to her, the degree of
certainty that she would suffer injury, the "closeness" of defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered, the degree of moral blame attached
23
to defendant's conduct and the policy of preventing future harm.
Referring to the Glanzer case, the court emphasized that here the
"end and aim" of the transaction was to provide for the passing of the
24
decedent's estate to the plaintiff.
In subsequent cases the California court applied the rule which
the first case developed for a notary public to attorneys who, in similar circumstances, were held liable for the pure economic loss of the
"intended beneficiary" of a last will and testament which, because of
the defendant's negligence, had failed to accomplish the intended
purpose. 2 5 Where, however, the defendant-lawyer's service was not
intended to benefit the third-party plaintiff, the court has denied liability.2 6 It reasoned that in cases in which the client deals with other
parties at arm's length, imposing liability to the third party on the
attorney "would inject undesirable self-protective reservations into
the attorney's counseling role. ' 27 It applied this reasoning, for example, to a case in which a lawyer had erroneously advised a small corporation and its managers that certain stock they planned to issue
21. For details, see the Bily case, supra n.15, at 757.
22. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
23. Id. at 19.
24. Id.
25. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161
(Cal. 1969).
26. See Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1976), Johnson v. Superior
Court 45 Cal. Rptr.2d 312 (Ct.App. 1995).
27. Goodman case, previous note, at 743. For a discussion of policy issues and
case law, see Feinman, "Attorney Liability to Nonclients," 31 Tort & Ins. L J. 735
(1996) and, from a more general perspective, Jay M. Feinman, Economic Negligence
(1995).
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did not require registration under federal law. After the stock had
been issued and investors had purchased it, the S.E.C. insisted on
registration which decreased the value of the stock. The investors,
28
however, were denied recovery for their pure economic loss.
B. Defective Products
The law pertaining to liability for defective products has undergone profound changes in the last four decades, both in the United
States and elsewhere. As a result, American courts are now routinely
imposing liability for negligence and strict liability in tort (delict) on
manufacturers and distributors of defective products in cases in
which a product has caused physical harm to person or property. In
addition, the law of sales may provide the plaintiff with a "contractual" remedy for breach of warranty, at least in certain circumstances. Obviously, the tort remedy does not require the plaintiff to
be in "privity," i.e., in a contractual relationship, with the defendant.
And under the law of most American states, the warranty claim may
be available even in the absence of privity between the parties, as it
29
is traditionally understood.
Much controversy has arisen with respect to the question of
whether "pure economic loss" can be recovered in a products liability
action. Once again it needs to be emphasized that economic loss resulting from personal injury caused by the product is not pure economic loss in this sense; it is thus, in principle, recoverable on a tort
theory together with compensation for the personal injury itself. The
same is true in cases involving damage to property other than the
defective product itself. Recovery can be had not only for the harm to
that piece of property, 30 but ordinarily also for consequential losses,
such as profits lost because the damaged item of property, for instance a machine in the plaintiffs factory, could not be used for its
31
usual productive purpose.
The continuing controversy involves the question whether economic loss can be recovered on a non-contractual basis when that loss
consists solely of harm to the defective product itself and consequential economic losses resulting therefrom. One of the early cases is
28. Goodman case, supra n. 26.
29. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318 Alternatives A to C. Note that the law
of the various states of the United States respecting the "privity" requirement under a
seller's warranty is not uniform.
30. Occasionally, a statute will preclude tort recovery for such damage in a sale
between merchants; see Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.10 (a) (West 1994). For cases, see
Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990), Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. DENTAL-EZ Inc. 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992).
31. As to the foregoing, see Restatement Third of Torts, Proposed Final Draft
(1997), § 21 (a) and (c). The extent to which such loss can be recovered in a concrete
case is governed by general principles of causation, etc.; see Restatement Second of
Torts §§ 430-461.
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Seely v. White Motor Co. in which Chief Justice Traynor wrote the
opinion for the California Supreme Court. 3 2 In this case the plaintiffbuyer sought to hold the defendant-seller of a truck liable for money
already paid on the purchase price, and for repair costs as well as lost
profits that he had incurred because the truck's defective brakes had
caused the vehicle to overturn. The court denied recovery under strict
(tort) products liability on the ground that a product's failure to perform according to the buyer's expectations is a matter exclusively regulated by the law of warranty. The court was concerned that
imposing strict liability in tort for harm to the product itself and economic losses resulting therefrom would tend to undermine the protection built into the law of warranty. It would expose the manufacturer,
as the court put it, to liability for damages of "unknown and unlimited scope" since "the manufacturer would be liable even though it did
not agree that the product would perform as plaintiff wished or ex33
pected it to do."
Even though the views expressed by the California court in Seely
are shared by the majority of jurisdictions, a minority of courts allow
tort recovery for pure economic loss in defective product cases under
certain conditions. In a New Jersey case the plaintiff had purchased a
carpet described as "#1grade" which turned out to be defective in that
two unusual lines appeared in it. It did not, however, damage other
property; nor did it create an unreasonable (or any) risk of harm.
Nonetheless, the court allowed the plaintiff to recover from the manufacturer for the "loss of bargain," i.e., the diminished value of the carpet, both on a warranty and a strict tort liability basis. 34 The courts
in the minority are satisfied that safety and insurance rationales justify strict liability for pure economic loss just as much as strict liability for personal injury and property damage resulting from product
defects.
While the extreme position of the New Jersey court in Santor is
probably not endorsed by many jurisdictions, there is a sizeable
group of courts which hold that tort rules (strict liability or negligence) should govern liability for pure economic loss where a product,
without causing personal injury or damage to other property, causes
a loss by an "accident-like" event, sometimes described as a "sudden
and calamitous" occurrence. It is argued that in such a situation the
product is shown to be dangerous and not only ineffective, and thus
32. See 403 P.2d 145 (Cal.1965).
33. Id. at 149, 150.
34. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965). The House
of Lords has taken the same position with respect to the installation of a defective
floor in Junior Books, Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd. [1983] 1 App. Cas. 520 (1982); but it
seems to have withdrawn from this position in more recent cases. See Christie, "The
Uneasy Place of Principle in Tort Law," 49 SMU L. Rev. 525, 531-36 (1996).
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rather an endanthe plaintiff is not merely a disappointed user, but
35
gered user who should be allowed to sue in tort.
Significantly, the Supreme Court of the United States had occasion to pronounce on the recovery of "pure economic loss"-at least as
it applies to maritime cases-in 1986. A unanimous court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun that influenced the development of the law
well beyond maritime law, found "the intermediate and minority
land-based positions unsatisfactory. '36 Consequently, the court
adopted the Seely position and repeated, in essence, the reasoning of
Chief Justice Traynor.3 7 In this case bare boat charterers of several
supertankers were seeking damages from the manufacturer of the
ships' turbine engines that had malfunctioned and thus necessitated
repairs resulting in sizeable costs and loss of profits. The court held
"that a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under
either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a
product from injuring itself."38 According to the U.S. Supreme Court,
in cases of an ineffective product or harm to the product itself the
public policy concern with safety is reduced and the damage most
naturally understood as a claim under warranty law which sufficiently protects the purchaser.3 9 The court emphasized the built-in
limitations on warranty actions resulting from the agreement of the
parties and the requirement under Hadley v. Baxendale40 that consequential damages must be a foreseeable result of the breach. By contrast, the court remarked, making the manufacturer liable for all
foreseeable purely economic loss would impose liability for "Vast
sums."

41

Technically, the East River ruling is not binding in cases outside
of maritime law. Nonetheless, it has had an extraordinary influence
on state courts in ordinary product liability cases.4 2 But it has also
encountered severe criticism. 4 3 Note, moreover, that the opinion's denial of tort -recovery, in cases where a defective product causes no
35. See, for example, two Alaska cases: Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324 (1981) and Kodiak Elec. Ass'n v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150 (1984). In addition, see cases cited in Restatement Third of

Torts, Proposed Final Draft, § 21, Reporter's Note pp. 379, 380.
36. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. 476 U.S. 858,
870 (1986). The "minority land-based position" refers to the Santor approach, while
the "intermediate land-based position" refers to the case law that uses the "sudden
and calamitous" event approach. All of these approaches deal with "land-based," as
distinguished from maritime, cases.
37. See supra text at nn. 32, 33.
38. East River case, supra n. 36, at 871.
39. Id. at 871, 872, 873.
40. 156 Eng.Rep.145 (Ex. 1854).
41. East River case, supra n. 36, at 874.
42. For a list of cases following East River, see Restatement Third of Torts, Proposed Final Draft (1997), §21, Reporter's Note, pp. 373-79.
43. See, for example, Swanson, "The Citadel Survives a Naval Bombardment: A
Policy Analysis of the Economic Loss Doctrine," 12 Mar. Law. 135 (1987).
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personal injury or damage to other property, is limited to what the
opinion calls the "commercial user." This would seem to leave open
the possibility of a different result in consumer cases. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey has pointed the way for such a differentiated
treatment. Already before the East River case was decided, that court
held its minority view of Santor 44 inapplicable to a commercial setting, and the U.S. Supreme Court took note of this distinction.4 5 At
least one post-East River case has refused to apply the exclusion of
tort liability for pure economic loss resulting from the defect as such
to a consumer transaction. 4 6 Another unresolved issue involves the
possibility of tort claims not based on strict liability and negligence,
for instance fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action.
It has been argued forcefully that such claims are not affected by the
47
East River restrictions.
In sum, the majority of American courts led by the U.S. Supreme
Court is firmly opposed to allowing tort damages for pure economic
loss resulting from a product defect. There is, however, one important
area in which many courts have made an exception. Where asbestos
had to be removed from buildings, the manufacturers have been held
liable in tort for the costs of removal if the presence of asbestos could
be considered a public safety concern. Not infrequently, judges have
tried to rationalize the result in these cases by arguing that the building, viewed as a piece of property separate from the asbestos installed
in it, had been "contaminated," and thus there was property damage
rather than merely a "pure" economic loss. 48 But this rationale looks
too much like hairsplitting and, if taken seriously, could be said to
apply to many other situations as well as to the asbestos cases. For
instance, in East River it could be argued that the ships were rendered less useful or, in certain situations like a storm, were rendered
completely helpless by the failure of the turbines to function properly, 49 and thus the ships were "damaged."50 A better explanation for
44. Supra n. 34.
45. See Spring Motor Distribution v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672 (N.J.
1985) and the East River case, supra n. 36, at 869 n. 4.
46. See Sherman v. Johnson and Towers Baltimore Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499, 502
(D.Md. 1990). For a critical assessment of this tendency, see O'Donnell, Weiss &
Kaplan, "On the Difference Between Blood and Red Ink: A Second Look at the Policy
Arguments for the Abrogation of the Economic Loss Rule in Consumer Litigation," 19
Nova L. Rev. 923 (1995).
47. See Nussbaum, "The Economic Loss Rule and Intentional Torts: A Shield or a
Sword?," 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 474 (1996). It could also be argued that the court's
rejection of the "sudden-and-calamitous-event" exception is mere dictum, since the
East River case, in the court's view, did not involve such an event.
48. See, for example, City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975 (4' Cir.
1987), Tioga Public School District No. 15 v. US Gypsum, 984 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1993).
49. One of the judges on the Court of Appeals in East River, Judge Becker,
thought that, for essentially this reason, the complaint stated a cause of action at
least with respect to one of the ships which was indeed exposed to a severe storm, see
East River, supra n. 36, at 862.
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the asbestos cases would seem to be the health and safety concerns
involved, combined with the fact that typically owners of the buildings affected, especially entities owning schools and other public
buildings, will find it hard to carry the costs of removal. 5 1 It should be
remembered that, in the East River case, the Supreme Court emphasized very much the "reduced" safety concern in cases of injury to the
product itself.52 While this reduced concern may generally be justified, the asbestos cases can be seen as an exception to this rule.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the current draft of the
Third Restatement defines as compensable loss in product liability
cases "economic loss if caused by harm to ... the person of another
when harm to the other interferes with a legally protected interest of
the plaintiff."53 This clause reminds us of the existence, discussed
before, 54 of claims derived from a wrongful death statute or, possibly,
the ancient form of action per quod consortium amisit. According to
the Draft Restatement, such claims can be asserted if a defective
product has caused the death of a close family member or, in states
where the consortium protection is still available, has injured a
spouse. No direct harm to the plaintiffs person has occurred in these
form of action take the case out of the
cases. But the statute or the old
55
loss.
economic
pure
of
realm
C. Interference with Use of Resources
This takes us to a category of cases which the commentators do
not usually group together. But the fact patterns we will encounter
here have more in common than meets the casual observer's eye. The
title chosen for this part of the paper is intended to signal the common denominator here.
50. Sometimes the line between damage to the product itself and damage to other
property can be very controversial. In A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
634 A.2d 1330 (Md. 1994), where a defective switch had caused a ventilating system
for a chicken house to fail, suffocating 140,000 chickens, it was held that the purchaser-farmer had not simply lost the benefit of his bargain, but had sustained damage to other property "because that defect is so dangerous in nature;" id. at 1337. But
in Winchester v. Lester's of Minnesota, Inc., 83 F.2d 992 ( 1 0th Cir. 1993) when hogs
died due to a poorly functioning ventilation system, the purchaser-farmer was held to
have no tort claim for property damage under Kansas law, even though the court
recognized the "plaintiffs loss of hogs... is property damage of a sort;" id. at 996.
Remembering the saying about the goose and the gander, one would think that what
is a "tort to the chickens" should be a "tort to the hogs."
51. The Wisconsin court in Northridge Co. v. W.C. Grace & Co., 491 N.W.2d 179
(Wis. 1991), relied more explicitly on such policy grounds than most other asbestos
decisions.
52. East River, supra n. 36, at 871. Where, however, a case involves a situation
amounting, in the court's view, to a "sudden and calamitous" event, a different assessment appears possible and not foreclosed by East River; see supra n. 47.
53. See Restatement of Torts Third, ProposedFinal Draft (1997) § 21(b), emphasis
added..
54. Text supra at nn. 6-8.
55. See id. comment c. and text supra at nn. 6-8.
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A series of misadventures that one commentator has called "almost comically bizarre" 5 6 occurred on the Buffalo River in New York
during the night of January 21, 1959, giving rise to the case of In re
Kinsman Transit Co. which reached the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit twice. 5 7 As a result of the events of January 21, two
ships had crashed into a drawbridge and blocked traffic on the Buffalo River for about two months. When the case reached the court for
the second time, it had to decide an issue that has all the earmarks of
pure economic loss. Two claimants demanded damages for losses they
had suffered because transportation on the river was disrupted, holding liable those whose negligence had caused the mishaps. One of the
claimants was under a contractual obligation, as a seller, to deliver
wheat from a ship that could not be unloaded because of the obstruction of Buffalo River traffic; the claimant had secured replacement
wheat at higher cost to fulfil his duties under the sales contract. The
other claimant, a carrier, had committed itself to unload a ship and
incurred increased costs because the conditions on the river caused
by the accident made the unloading more complicated. The Second
Circuit held that neither of these claimants could recover in tort. But
instead of invoking the doctrine of no liability for pure economic loss
the court determined that the loss was too "remote" or "indirect." The
lower court in this case, however, analyzed the situation in terms of
"negligent interference with contract" and relied on the Robins Dry
Dock case, discussed earlier, 58 to deny recovery.5 9 In the most interesting passage of its opinion, the Second Circuit said: "[W]e hesitate
to accept the 'negligent interference with contract' doctrine in the absence of satisfactory reasons for differentiating contractual rights
from other interests which the law protects."60 In other words, the
court had serious doubts about the very foundation of the pure economic loss doctrine for which the Robins Dry Dock case stands not as
the original, but as the most prominent American authority.
In another water-related set of cases, courts have departed from
6
the doctrine of no liability for economic loss. In Union Oil v. Oppen '
a group of commercial fishermen sought recovery for loss of profits
resulting from an oil spill in the Santa Barbara Channel on the California coast. The defendants had caused the oil spill in the course of
drilling operations carried out on a platform in that Channel. In a
well-reasoned opinion the federal court held that, both under maritime and under California law, the defendants were liable to the
plaintiffs, since they owed a duty to them "to refrain from negligent
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See
See
See
See
See

Christie, supra n. 34, at 536.
338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) and 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
supra text with nn. 2 and 3.
the second opinion in In re Kinsman, 388 F.2d 821, at 823.
id.

61. 501 F.2d 558 ( 9 th Cir. 1974).
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conduct in their drilling operations, which conduct reasonably and
foreseeably could have been anticipated to cause a diminution of the
aquatic life in the Santa Barbara Channel area and thus cause injury
to the plaintiffs'- business. '6 2 Relying on California cases such as
Biakanja v. Irving, one of the intellectual service cases discussed
before, 63 the court found it to be "obvious" that California is quite
willing to make exceptions, on policy grounds, to the rule denying recovery for pure economic loss in negligence. 64 Furthermore, the court
was convinced that under California law "the presence of a duty on
the part of the defendants in this case would turn substantially on
foreseeability," 6 5 and foreseeability, in the court's view, was not in
serious doubt. 66 Consequently, the fishermen were allowed to recover
their lost profits.
There is conflicting authority on whether economic interests
other than those of commercial fishermen should enjoy the same protection in the case of water pollution as that obtained by the plaintiffs
involved in the Santa Barbara incident. While, for example, the court
in Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp.67 granted plaintiffs such recovery,
it was denied in State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MIV Testbank.6 s
Closely related to these water pollution cases is a much discussed
New Jersey case in which the plaintiff airline suffered loss of profits
due to the evacuation of its offices necessitated by a tank car accident
at a nearby railroad yard resulting in the escape of a dangerous
chemical. 6 9 After carefully reviewing and analyzing the case law, the
court concluded that the many exceptions to the rule of no liability for
economic loss "expose the hopeless artificiality of the per se rule" and
continued: "The scope and number of exceptions, while indepently
justified on various grounds, have nonetheles created lasting doubt
as to the wisdom of the per se rule of nonrecovery for purely economic
losses." 70 The New Jersey court saw no need to make physical harm
the crucial test of liability for negligence; like the court in Union Oil
v. Oppen, it considered foreseeability as a sufficient standard. It emphasized that this standard must be met for a determination both of
the existence of a duty owed and of proximate cause between the
breach of the duty of care and resultant losses. According to the court,
this dual foreseeability requirement provides satisfactory protection
62. Id. at 568.
63. Text, supra at nn. 22-24.
64.

65.
66.
67.
68.

See Union Oil v. Oppen, supra n. 61, at 566.

Id. at 569.
Id.
523 F.Supp. 975 (E.D.Va. 1981).
752 F.2d 1019 (5 th Cir. 1985).

69. See People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107

(N.J. 1985).
70. Id. at 114, 115.
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from the risk of disproportionate liability. 7 1 Applying the foreseeability criteria to the facts of the case, the court felt persuaded that a
cause of action had been established, but noted that the plaintiff still
task in proving damages to the degree of certainty
faced a difficult
72
required.
As in the water pollution incidents and in People Express, a temporary interruption of business activities gave rise to another California case. 73 An action claiming damages for lost profits was instituted
by the plaintiff, who operated a restaurant in leased premises,
against the lessee's contractor who had delayed completion of improvements to the premises, including renovation of the heating and
air conditioning system and installation of insulation. 7 4 The Supreme
Court of California restated its principles of liability for negligent
conduct emphasizing the crucial role of the duty of care and the fact
that, under its case law, recovery is not foreclosed "even when only
injury to prospective economic advantage is claimed." 75 In support of
this statement the court referred, in particular, to its precedents76 in
the intellectual services area, among them the Biakanja decision. It
could, of course, also have invoked Union Oil v. Oppen,7 7 a leading
case decided under California law, except for the fact that this was a
decision by a federal court. An application of the Biakanja criteria led
the court to conclude that the defendant owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff to complete construction in a manner that would avoid un:
necessary injury to the plaintiffs business, where such injury is reasonably foreseeable. 78 In the court's view, a cause of action had thus
been stated, given the (alleged) significant delay in performance by
the defendant, (allegedly) causing a significant loss of profits in the
plaintiffs restaurant business.
III.

SCHOLARLY DEBATE

As the foregoing, by no means exhaustive, survey shows, the
American law of liability for purely economic losses is much less well
settled and less uniform than one might wish it to be. And the ongoing discussion of the topic in the legal literature does not seem to
have provided much helpful guidance for the courts. Only a small
number of publications will be discussed here to explain why this is
SO.
71. Id. at 115, 116.
72. Id. at 118.
73. See J'Aire Corporation v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).

74. Id. at 61
75. Id. at 63.
76. See supra n.22.
77. See supra n. 61.
78. J'Aire case, supra n. 73, at 64, 66.
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It has been noted repeatedly that the practice which, in many
instances, denies recovery for pure economic loss in negligence cases
is hard to reconcile with the recovery for potentially large economic
losses resulting from negligently caused physical injury. Foreseeability has become the most crucial test to limit the extent of liability for
the consequences of negligent conduct resulting in physical injury.
More restrictive tests such as privity, used at an earlier stage of the
development of the Common Law, have been abandoned. 79 Thus the
question has been asked many times: Why is it that, in the absence of
physical injury, most courts still deny recovery for pure economic loss
in negligence cases unless one of the numerous exceptions applies?
The argument that purely economic losses are generally unforeseeable has been rejected by one author as quite "unrealistic."8 0 But
the same author argues that there is a good "pragmatic" explanation
for the prevailing practice. In his view, the "physical consequences of
negligence usually have been limited, but the indirect economic
repercussions of negligence may be far wider, indeed virtually openended."8 1 In view of today's mass tort cases, which sometimes involve
innumerable physically injured victims asserting claims sometimes
amounting to millions of Dollars, it is not easy to accept this explanation as satisfactory.
Another rationale advanced by the same author looks to the insurance aspects of purely economic losses. In this regard it is argued
that (1) a liability system based on fault and coupled with liability
insurance is the most expensive way to administer accident losses
and (2) that there are serious practical problems facing insurers in
handling insurance against potentially wide, open-ended liability.
These considerations are said to support a rule of no liability for pure
economic loss coupled with the possibility of first-party loss insurance
to be taken out by those whose interests are at risk (at presumably
lower cost than liability insurance).8 2 All of the foregoing considerations, however, would seem to be applicable to the whole American
accident compensation system relying, as it does, mainly on tort liability and liability insurance rather than social insurance and private
first-party insurance. It is indeed an extremely costly system which
tends to produce very uneven results and which must sometimes deal
with large risks that defy actuarial measurement. All of this is gener79. A leading case exemplifying this development is MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). The earlier restrictive (privity) approach is illustrated
by the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) and the
New York case of Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873).
80. See, for instance, James, "Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused
by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal," 25 Vand. L. Rev. 43, 45 (1972).
81. Id. This statement is followed by a reference to the often quoted passage from
Cardozo's opinion in Ultramares, also quoted in the text supra at n. 11.

82. Id. at 52, 53.
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ally accepted as true whether or not pure economic loss is
recoverable.
Another author has suggested that (1) the pure economic loss
cases must be seen as sharing some important similarities with other
kinds of non-physical tortious harm and that (2) various types of pure
economic loss must be more clearly distinguished from each other.8 3
Emotional distress and consortium cases are said to be non-physical
harm cases presenting problems comparable, in certain respects,
with pure economic loss problems. Courts have expanded the right to
recovery for emotional distress and for loss of consortium in favor of
certain relatives of the immediate victim, but not of others, irrespective of foreseeability.8 4 This practice is said to express a concern
about "widespread liability." Likewise, in pure economic loss cases
such "ripple effect" liability must be avoided by limiting recovery to
certain situations within a category that the author defines as "triangular configurations. 8 5 This term is designed to describe situations
like the intellectual services cases discussed earlier in this paper.8 6
The author agrees with those who would allow recovery in a "triangu87
lar configuration" only for intended beneficiaries.
Underlying all of these distinctions is once again a belief that
widespread liability is a serious concern only in nonphysical harm
cases, and that widespread liability is generally of no concern when
negligence has caused personal injury or physical damage to property.8 8 It is significant that the author in his search for a paradigm to
demonstrate the limited destructive potential of physical harm situations, comes up with the age-old (privity) case of Winterbottom v.
Wright8 9 in which a stagecoach broke down due to lack of repairs and,
as a consequence, injured the driver. 90 When this paradigm is used
today, it would seem that more than 150 years of rapid industrialization with the attendant phenomenon of mass torts involving physical
injuries of sometimes staggering proportions go virtually unnoticed.
The author is somewhat closer to this reality in his discussion of a
plane crash killing 200 passengers due to a defect in the plane's manufacture caused by a single instance of assembly-line inattentiveness.
Here he accepts widespread liability (even though it is arguably dis83. See Rabin, "Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment," 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1513 (1985).
84. Id. at 1517-26.
85. Id. at 1527-34.
86. See supra Part II A.
87. Id. at 1528. Rabin attributes the "intended beneficiary" doctrine to Cardozo,
when in fact the New York Court of Appeals under Cardozo's leadership adopted a
"quasi-privity" approach; see supra at n. 12. The Second Restatement of Torts, on the
other hand, has embraced the "intended beneficiary" idea. See supra Part II A.
88. Id. at 1530, 1532.
89. See supra n. 79.
90. Id. at the top of 1530.
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proportionate) on the ground that "the victims constitute a single
class-they suffer a type of harm in common." 9 1 But certainly a plane
crash with 200 victims, a single-event incident, is not the only form of
mass disasters and not necessarily the one with the most widespread
consequences imaginable. The reality of the most serious mass calamities, as we see it in multi-event product injuries present in DES,
asbestos or breast implant cases, is again ignored. 9 2 In order to offer
a satisfactory explanation for the different treatment of pure economic losses in negligence cases, one would have to face up to these
contemporary developments in the realm of physical injuries. Unfortunately, this kind of analysis is missing.
Rather than seeking to explain the rule of no liability for pure
economic loss, some authors focus more on the exceptions to the rule.
Their search for consistency in the law leads several authors, sympathetic to the "pragmatic concern" which is said to underlie the noliability rule,9 3 to conclude that exceptions should have been made in
certain kinds of cases where the rule was in fact applied. 9 4 Ironically,
this includes not only cases like J'Aire,9 5 but also the leading prece96
dent in this area, Justice Holmes's opinion in the Robins Dry Docks
case. The "pragmatic concern" about widespread and open-ended liability has no valid application where, because a lease is in effect,
physical damage to property causes the resulting loss to be suffered,
due to the terms of the lease, by the lessee and not by the owner. The
only serious problem in such a situation is the technical one of deciding which plaintiff(s)-the lessor, the lessee or both jointly-should
be given standing. 97 To the comparatist, it is immediately apparent
that courts and writers in other systems have not misconceived this
kind of situation as a form of pure economic loss. Realizing that there
is, after all, physical damage and there is loss, these foreign courts
and observers see the problem as one of attribution, and they have
found fairly adequate answers to the questions raised, including the
standing issue. 98
Pursuing the same line of arguments, according to at least one of
the authors, another exception from the rule of no liability for pure
economic loss should probably be made in cases in which an employer
91. Rabin, supra n. 83, at 1533.
92. For a description and analysis of such situations under American law, see
Peterson & Zekoll, "Mass Torts," 42 (Supplement) Am. J. Comp. L. 79 (1994).
93. See James, supra n.80.
94. See James, supra n.80, at 56, 57. and Schwartz, "The Economic Loss Doctrine
in American Tort Law: Assessing the Recent Experience," in Efstathios K. Banakas
(ed.), Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss (1996) at 103, 123-25.
95. See supra n. 73.
96. See supra n. 2.
97. Accord, James, supra n.80, at 56.
98. Under German law, for example, Schadensliquidationim Drittinteresse is
available.
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incurs a loss due to payments to, or on account of, an employee who
has suffered a personal injury. 9 9 It is argued that, if these payments
represent items the employee would be entitled to recover were it not
for the payment from the employer, then the "pragmatic objection" to
liability for pure economic loss has no legitimate application. 10 0 Of
course, this suggestion has implications respecting the so-called collateral source rule which require careful consideration. If, however,
the suggestion is accepted, the very foundation of the per se rule of no
liability for pure economic loss may become questionable.
It is fair to say that most writers are opposed to the tendency
exhibited by the California Supreme Court and the New Jersey
Supreme Court in many of the cases discussed above, which can be
seen as pointing in the direction of a break with the rule. The unanimous opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in the East River case is
sometimes referred to as providing support for a counter trend. 10 1
But the Supreme Court made it clear in East River that it did not
decide the issue of whether "a tort cause of action can ever be stated
in admiralty when the only damages sought are economic."10 2 The
truth of the matter is that neither East River nor the state law cases
involving defective products discussed earlier in this paper 10 3 furnish
much, if any, arguments for or against the rule denying damages for
pure economic loss in negligence cases in general. These cases, when
analyzed carefully, merely deal with the issue of whether recovery
for damage caused by a defective product, in the absence of physical
harm to a person or property, can be based only on the supplier's contract or also on tort, i.e., strict liability or negligence. The majority of
courts led by the California Supreme Court in Seely10 4 view the contract set of remedies as exclusive of the tort remedy in these situations, while a strong minority led by the New Jersey Supreme
Court 10 5 allow a tort action in addition to the contract cause of action,
at least in certain situations. Only the minority view includes an implicit exception to the rule of no liability for pure economic loss in
negligence (and strict liability) cases. The majority position, on the
99. Traditionally, this situation is seen as undoubtedly subject to the rule; see
supra text at n. 5.

100. See James, supra n. 80, at 57.
101. See, for instance, Christie, supra n. 34, at 537 and George C. Christie et al.,
Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts 813 (3' ed. 1997).
102. See East River case, supra n. 36, at 871 n. 6. The statement quoted in the text
is followed by a "But see . . ." referring to Robins Dry Dock. The court was probably

aware of the severe criticism of Justice Holmes's opinion discussed above and simply
did not want to review the general issue of recovery for pure economic loss.
103. See supra Part II B.
104. See supra n. 32.
105. See the Santor case, supra n. 34, as limited in its application to noncommercial cases by the Spring Motors case, supra n. 45.
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other hand, as Justice Blackmun made clear in East River, is 10based
6
on the exclusiveness of the contract remedy and nothing else.
But even if Justice Blackmun's opinion does not lend renewed
support, in a general way, to the rule against recovery for pure economic loss in negligence, most commentators are less inclined than
the highest courts in California and New Jersey to abandon the per se
rule in favor of a foreseeability test. More recently, an economic rationale operating with the dichotomy of private loss versus social loss,
has been offered by several scholars in defense of the rule against the
recent judicial tendencies. 10 7 If one accepts this kind of analysis, it
could be argued that there should be no recovery for economic loss in
a case like J'Aire, 0 8 if the business that the restaurant owned by the
plaintiff lost went to other restaurants in the neighborhood. If that
happened, then there may have been a private loss (the plaintiffs),
but no social loss. Other authors, however, even those generally in
favor of the no-liability rule, reply that the absence of social loss cannot be the sole determinant of tort damages. Where the plaintiff has
suffered private loss, arguments of fairness and justice must also be
considered. 10 9
For reasons of limitations of space this survey of scholarly contributions must end here. It should at least show why courts and the
bar are not really helped very much by the commentators. As long as
today's reality of mass torts involving multi-event physical injuries is
virtually ignored in the debate of pure economic loss, scholars do not
make sense to the practitioners. Also, the academics have not even
begun to conceptualize the phenomenon of negligent interference
with the use of resources. 1 10 Once that concept is accepted, old questions will have to be asked in a different perspective. Why, the question will be, should only an individual right based in private law, as
for instance that of a lessee,"' deserve protection from such interference? If, on the other hand, certain users of public resources, such as
the fishermen in Union Oil v. Oppen," 2 are entitled to recover for
106. Even with respect to this limited reach, the opinion is not free from confusion;
for details, see Schwartz, supra n. 94, at 122-23.
107. See, for example, Bishop & Sutton, "Efficiency and Justice in Tort Damages:
The Shortcomings of the Pecuniary Loss Rule," 15 J. Leg. St. 347 (1986), Goldberg,
"Recovery for Economic Loss Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill," 23 J. Leg. St. 1
(1994).
108. See supra n. 73.
109. See Schwartz, supra n. 94, at 128-30.
110. See supra Part II C. An impressive effort has been made, however, to reconceptualize the entire law of "economic negligence;" see Feinman, "Doctrinal Classification and Economic Negligence," 33 San Diego L. Rev. 137 (1996) and the same
author's book, supra n. 27. The term "economic negligence" seems to have been introduced into legal discourse by a Canadian author discussing primarily English and
Commonwealth law; see Bruce P. Feldthusen, Economic Negligence: The Recovery of
Pure Economic Loss (3' ed. 1994).
111. Like the plaintiff in J'Aire, supra n. 73.
112. See supra n. 61.
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their pure economic loss, why should other users of public resources,
like the claimants in In re Kinsman (No.2), 113 not be granted recovery? The answer may be that it makes a difference whether the interference with a use of resources effectively shuts down a business, at
least temporarily, or just increases the costs of running a business.
More probing inquiry is needed, many questions remain.

113. See supra n. 59.
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